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Essays on the Redistributive Effects
of the Minimum Wage
Claire Montialoux
Essay 1
Minimum Wages and Racial Inequality
(with Ellora Derenoncourt)
One of the most striking dimensions of inequality in the
United States is the persistence of large racial economic
disparities (Bayer and Charles 2018; Chetty et al. 2020). A
major aspect of these disparities is the earnings difference
between black and white workers. There is a 25 percent gap
between the average annual earnings of white and African
American workers today.1 Over the past 70 years, this gap
fell significantly only once, during the late 1960s and early
1970s, when it was reduced by a factor of about two. What
made the white-black earnings gap fall? Understanding the
factors behind this historical improvement may provide
insights for reducing the large racial disparities that still exist
today.
A large literature has put forward various explanations for
the decline in racial inequality during the 1960s and 1970s,
including federal antidiscrimination legislation (Freeman
1973) and improvements in education (Card and Krueger
1992; Smith and Welch 1989). The magnitude of the decline,
however, remains a puzzle (see Donohue and Heckman
[1991]).
This chapter provides a new explanation for falling
racial earnings gaps during this period: the extension of the
federal minimum wage to new sectors of the economy. The
Fair Labor Standards Act of 1966 introduced the federal
minimum wage (as of February 1967) in sectors that were
previously uncovered and where black workers were
overrepresented: agriculture, hotels, restaurants, schools,
hospitals, nursing homes, entertainment, and other services.
These sectors employed about 20 percent of the total U.S.
workforce and nearly a third of all black workers. Perhaps
surprisingly, the role of this major reform in the muchstudied decline in racial inequality during the Civil Rights
Era has not been analyzed before. We show that it had large
positive effects on wages for low-wage workers and that the
effects were more than twice as large for black workers as
for white. Our estimates suggest that the 1967 extension of
the minimum wage can explain more than 20 percent of the
decline in the racial earnings gap between 1965 and 1980.
Moreover, we find that this reform did not have large adverse
employment effects on either black or white workers. The
extension of the minimum wage thus not only reduced the
racial earnings gap (the difference in earnings for employed
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individuals) but also the racial income gap (the difference in
income between black and white individuals, whether working or not). To our knowledge, this chapter provides the first
causal evidence on how minimum wage policy affects racial
income disparities.
Our contribution in this chapter is twofold. First, we
provide an in-depth analysis of the causal effect of the 1967
extension of the minimum wage—a large natural quasiexperiment—on the dynamics of wages and employment. To
conduct this analysis, we use a variety of data sources and
research designs that paint a consistent picture. A key data
contribution of this chapter is to assemble a novel dataset on
hourly wages by industry, occupation, gender, and region. In
the 1960s, 1970s, and 1980s, the Bureau of Labor Statistics
(BLS) published regular industry wage reports with detailed
information on the distribution of hourly wages by $0.05
and $0.10 bins, including the number of workers employed
in each of these bins. For the purposes of this research, we
digitized more than 1,000 of these tabulations. This new data
source allows us to provide transparent and robust evidence
on the effects of the 1967 minimum wage extension on
wages and employment. We also rely on microdata from the
March Current Population Survey (CPS), which allow us to
investigate how the effects of the reform vary with race and
other socioeconomic characteristics such as education. Taken
together, the CPS and BLS data enable us to provide consistent and clear graphical evidence of the short- and mediumterm impacts of the extension of the minimum wage.
The analysis proceeds in two steps. First, we show that
the 1967 reform had a large effect on wages for workers at
the bottom of the earnings distribution. Our newly digitized
BLS data reveal clear evidence of an immediate and sharp
hourly wage increase for low-paid workers: a large mass of
workers paid below $1 in 1966 (the level of the minimum
wage introduced in 1967) bunches at $1 in 1967. To quantify
the magnitude of the wage effect, our baseline empirical
approach is a cross-industry difference-in-differences
research design: we compare the dynamics of wages in
the newly vs. previously covered industries, before and
after 1967. In the CPS data, the average annual earnings of
workers in the industries covered in 1967 (our treated group)
evolve in parallel with the annual earnings of workers in
the industries covered in 1938 (our control group) before
the reform. In 1967, they jump by 5.3 percent relative to the
control industries, and the effect persists through the late
1970s. The magnitude of the increase is consistent with the
predicted effect of the minimum wage hike estimated using
the prereform CPS. We obtain a similar increase in average
hourly wage in the newly covered industries using the BLS
data. We estimate that 16 percent of workers in the treated
industries are affected by the reform and that they receive
a 34 percent wage increase on average in 1967. The wage
effect on treated workers is large because before 1967, many
of them (predominantly black workers) were employed at
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wages far below the federal minimum wage of $1 introduced
in 1967. The wage increase in the newly covered industries
is concentrated among workers with a low level of education.
The magnitude of the wage effect is robust to a series of tests
and to controlling for a wide range of observable characteristics and time trends.
In the second step, we study the effect of the 1967 minimum wage extension on employment. We first estimate
employment’s effect using geographic variation in the bite of
the reform. Just as today, some states had their own minimum
wage laws (on top of the federal minimum wage) in the 1960s
while others did not. This variation made the 1967 reform
more or less binding across states. We build a minimum wage
database by state, industry, and gender spanning the 1950–
2016 period. We compare states without a state minimum
wage law as of January 1966 (strongly treated) to other states
(weakly treated). Because the federal minimum wage was
high in the late 1960s (much higher than today relative to the
median wage), the 1967 reform is a particularly large shock in
the strongly treated states. Using this research design, we show
that the 1967 reform had a near-zero effect on employment.
We are able to rule out employment elasticities with respect
to average wages greater (in absolute sense) than −0.16. The
results hold for black workers in isolation, for whom employment elasticities greater than −0.24 can be ruled out.
We build on these analyses by using our BLS data and
implementing a bunching estimator following Harasztosi
and Lindner (2019) and Cengiz et al. (2019). Within treated
industries, we compare the number of workers paid strictly
below the minimum wage and those paid at or slightly above
the minimum wage in the observed 1967 wage distribution
to those in a counterfactual distribution with no minimum
wage reform. We first present estimates of the employment
effect of the reform for an important case study—laundries in
the U.S. South— where the reform was particularly binding
(over one-third of workers were paid below the minimum
wage prior to the reform) and where black workers were
overrepresented (40 percent of the workforce). We document
a near-zero effect on employment in this sector and region.
We then demonstrate that this near-zero effect holds across
many industry and region subgroups. Overall, our bunching
results suggest low employment responses in treated industries in the United States as a whole. Our findings are robust
to considering alternative assumptions on the extent of spillover effects from the minimum wage.2
The second—and most important—contribution of this
chapter is to uncover the key role of minimum wage policies in the dynamics of racial inequality. We show that the
extension of the minimum wage during the Civil Rights
Era can explain more than 20 percent of the decline in the
unadjusted black-white earnings gap observed during this
critical time period. The reform reduced the gap through
two channels. First, the gap between the average wage in the
treated industries and the rest of the economy fell. Because
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black workers were overrepresented in the treated industries,
this between-industry convergence reduced the U.S.-wide
racial gap. Second, within the newly covered industries, the
wage increase is much larger for black than for white workers, and hence the reform sharply reduced the unadjusted
racial gap within the treated industries. This within-industry
effect accounts for more than 80 percent of the impact of
the reform on the economy-wide racial gap. The reform
also sharply reduced the adjusted racial earnings gap (i.e.,
the difference in earnings between black and white workers
conditional on observable characteristics) within the treated
industries, from 25 log points prior to 1967 to about 0 after.
That is, within agriculture and laundries, for example, black
workers were paid 25 log points less than white workers
with similar observables (such as education, experience, and
number of hours worked) when the federal minimum wage
did not apply, and this difference falls to close to zero after
the introduction of the federal minimum wage. Combined
with the evidence of limited effects on black employment,
these results suggest that the 1967 reform was effective at
advancing black economic status.
Conceptually, our results are consistent with competitive
models of the labor market characterized by low elasticity of demand for workers in the newly covered industries
and inelastic demand for black workers, in particular.3 We
provide evidence that substitution toward white workers was
extremely limited in the newly covered industries after the
reform. This may stem in part from the high degree of occupational segregation prevalent in the labor market at the time.
Black workers were concentrated in low-status jobs throughout our period of analysis, and white workers may have been
unwilling to assume these positions at the wages prevailing
postreform. Under these conditions, the minimum wage can
improve black workers’ relative wages without resulting in
their significant relative disemployment.

Essay 2
The Pass-Through of Minimum Wages into
U.S. Retail Prices: Evidence from Supermarket
Scanner Data
(with Tobias Renkin and Michael Siegenthaler)
In recent years, a number of U.S. states and municipalities
have increased their minimum wage, in a context of low wage
growth and stagnation of the federal minimum wage. Similarly, several European countries have introduced a national
minimum wage (e.g., Germany) or hiked their minimum wage
(e.g., the United Kingdom).
A large body of research in economics shows that moderate increases in the minimum wage have no or limited
disemployment effects (see, for example, Card and Krueger
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[1994]; Belman and Wolfson [2014]; Cengiz et al. [2019]),
suggesting that such a policy can raise nominal incomes of
low-wage workers. However, there is much less evidence on
how changes in the minimum wage affect consumer prices
(see Lemos [2008] for a literature review) and therefore
real incomes. In principle, it is possible that nominal wage
increases for low-wage workers may be partly offset by
increases in the prices of the goods and services consumed
by the poorest households. To assess the economic impact of
minimum wage changes on real incomes, it is thus central to
understand the pass-through of minimum wage increases into
prices.
We exploit a large number of changes in the minimum
wage between 2001 and 2012 and leverage scanner-level
data from weekly price observations of 2,500 distinct grocery
and drug stores. We make three main contributions. First, we
provide new evidence on how minimum wages affect prices
in the grocery sector, which has not been previously studied
in the literature.4 The grocery sector is especially important
because the share of minimum wage labor costs in groceries’ marginal cost is sizable, and because groceries make
up a large share of consumer expenditure, up to 15 percent
for low-income households. Second, we take advantage of
the high frequency of scanner data to study the dynamics
of the price response over time. Since minimum wage laws
are usually passed several months before implementation
and typically set a schedule of increases rather than one-off
hikes, firms may increase prices in anticipation of higher
future minimum wages. We use a newly collected dataset
with legislation dates for every minimum wage increase in
our sample period, and we find strong evidence for anticipation effects. Third, we use a large consumer panel data linked
to the store-level information to investigate how the price
response varies across household income groups. This allows
us to better understand the implications of minimum wage
changes for real incomes.
Our main finding is that there is a full pass-through of
minimum wage increases into grocery prices. Our main
research design compares monthly price movements across
states exploiting time variation in state-level minimum
wage hikes. We supplement this approach by using a second
identification strategy that exploits within-state variation
in the bite of the hikes. We find that a 10 percent minimum
wage hike translates into a 0.36 percent increase in grocery prices. Importantly, there is no statistically significant
difference between the average price elasticity of 0.036 and
our estimate of the minimum wage elasticity of groceries’
costs, which suggests a full pass-through of minimum wage
cost increases into prices. We do not find evidence that
the demand for grocery products changes, nor do we find
evidence that stores reduce employment. Taken together,
these results suggest that consumers, rather than firm owners
or workers, bear the bulk of the burden of minimum wage
increases in the grocery sector.
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Another important finding of this paper, with implications for macroeconomic models, is that price adjustments
occur mostly in the three months following the passage of
a minimum wage legislation, rather than after implementation. In other words, grocery and drug stores appear to be
forward-looking in their pricing decisions. Using Google
Trends data, we show that the legislation of minimum wage
increases represents a very salient event in the public. Based
on flexible event study regressions tracking prices around
the months in which minimum wage hikes are legislated,
we find that grocery stores respond to future cost increases
by increasing prices months before the minimum wage is
actually implemented. This type of forward-looking behavior
of firms is qualitatively consistent with the predictions of
purely rational models, where firms think about the future
as well as the present (i.e., they are not myopic). The rise in
prices occurs mostly through an increase in the frequency of
price changes.
Last, we quantify the welfare consequences of minimum
wage hikes after accounting for our estimated pass-through
of minimum wages into prices. We estimate that the price
effects of minimum wage increases are similar for goods
usually consumed by low-income and high-income households. Low-income households are nevertheless disproportionately affected by the rise in grocery prices since a larger
share of their expenditures is on groceries. The rise in grocery store prices reduces real income by about $24 a year for
households earning less than $10,000 a year, and by about
$78 a year for those earning more than $150,000.
The price increases in grocery stores offset only a relatively small part of the gains of minimum wage hikes. Minimum wage policies thus remain a redistributive tool, even
after accounting for price effects in grocery stores.
This chapter contributes to a body of work in labor
economics and macroeconomics. First, this chapter provides
novel insights into the redistributive effects of minimum
wages and into the price effects of minimum wages in lowwage sectors. A small literature studies the product market
effects of minimum wage increases. This literature has
focused on restaurants (see, e.g., Aaronson [2001], Allegretto
and Reich [2018]).5 Our contribution to this literature is to
study the impact of minimum wage changes in a new sector,
the grocery sector. This sector employs a high and rising
share of workers at or just above the minimum wage; therefore, the effect of minimum wage hikes is potentially large.
Moreover, groceries are an important component of
households’ cost of living, particularly for poor households.
Groceries make up 11 percent of household expenditures,
two to three times more than spending on restaurant meals,
depending on household income.
We break new ground in documenting the price response
in the retail sector, thanks to the availability of high-quality
scanner-level data. These data enable us to overcome certain
shortcomings in studies of the price effects of minimum
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wages. These limitations include classical measurement
error (Aaronson 2001; Card and Krueger 1994), the use of
city-level CPI data that are only available in the largest U.S.
metro areas (Aaronson 2001; Aaronson and French 2007;
Aaronson, French, and MacDonald 2008), and the fact that
price and wage changes in restaurants may not be well measured due to tipping and quality changes (e.g., size of portions served). These concerns do not apply to retail scanner
data, as products in grocery stores are very standardized and
retail workers are not tipped. Compared to official BLS price
indexes, our microdata allow us to compute price changes
by income group (as well as price changes conditional on
nonzero price adjustments).6
Most closely related to our work are the contemporary
papers by Leung (forthcoming) and Ganapati and Weaver
(2017), who also study the pass-through of minimum wage
changes into retail prices. These papers focus on a different
period (2006–2015 and 2005–2015, respectively, vs. 2001–
2012 in our study), are based on another dataset (the Nielsen
data), and use different identification strategies. Ganapati and
Weaver (2017) find a zero pass-through of minimum wage
increases into prices, and Leung (forthcoming) more than a
full pass-through. We reconcile our findings with these two
studies in our appendix.
The main substantial difference between our work and
these two studies is that we document the forward-looking
pricing decision of grocery stores by studying the effect
of minimum wage legislation (before implementation) on
subsequent price changes. Two other distinctive features of
our work include studying in detail whether our results are
consistent with full pass-through of prices into costs, and
quantifying the extent to which the price increases in grocery
stores affect the redistributive effects of minimum wage
policies.
Second, this chapter contributes to the macroeconomic
literature on price-setting. We provide causal evidence of the
effect of a rise in labor costs on retail price inflation. This
adds to the macro literature that has mainly focused on the
effects of rising wholesale costs on pricing decisions.7 Our
detailed microdata allow us to document a price response to
a future cost shock at the time it becomes known and several
months before it actually occurs. Because minimum wage
changes can be seen as a shock to grocery store activities,
which is plausibly exogenous, these shocks can help identify
the effect of movements in costs on prices. Our results highlight the role of expectations in the propagation of shocks.8
Forward-looking price setting is a central prediction of
state-dependent models (i.e., menu cost models), as well as
time-dependent models with nominal frictions. These latter
models include the Calvo (1983) model of staggered price
setting and models with adjustment costs such as Rotemberg (1982). In the macroeconomics literature, these models
have been used as a microeconomic foundation for the New
Keynesian Phillips Curve (see, e.g., Gali [2015]).
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Finally, we contribute to the research on price rigidity in
retail chains. We provide evidence that chains try to maintain
uniform prices across grocery stores in the United States. We
find that, within interregional chains, a minimum wage hike
in one state affects prices in stores within the same chain
located in another state. These results suggest that minimum
wage hikes can affect consumer welfare in other states.
Consistently, we find that grocery prices are more responsive to local minimum wage hikes in regional chains than
in national chains. This is consistent with Dellavigna and
Gentzkow (2019), who document uniform pricing decisions
in the retail sector in response to local economic shocks in
general, and to Leung (forthcoming), who documents this
behavior in the case of local minimum wage hikes.

Essay 3
The Economic Effect of a $15 Minimum Wage
in the United States: A Simulation Approach
(with Sylvia Allegretto and Michael Reich)
In April 2017, Senators Bernie Sanders (D-VT), Patty
Murray (D-WA), and Chuck Schumer (D-NY) announced
legislation that would raise the federal minimum wage to
$15 an hour in the United States by 2024. In this bill, the
minimum wage increases are phased in over eight years,
starting with $9.25 an hour on July 1, 2017, and reaching $15
an hour in 2024. The minimum wage would be indexed to
the median wage growth thereafter. The goal of this chapter
is to connect research with policy by providing an ex ante
evaluation of this bill.
The minimum wage is a recurrent policy issue, and there
are many analyses of the effects of minimum wage increases
on incomes of families with members who receive a raise
(Congressional Budget Office 2014; Cooper 2013, 2017),
and the effects on incomes of families with members who
lose their jobs (Congressional Budget Office 2014). Here,
we attempt to evaluate the employment effects of minimum wage policies that take into account how all economic
agents—not just workers, but workers, businesses, and consumers— are affected and respond to such a policy, and we
integrate their responses in a unified manner. In particular,
we take into account the effects of minimum wage increases
on aggregate demand, and how they boost consumer spending and GDP. In what follows, we estimate a calibrated labor
market model that we created specifically to analyze the
effects of a $15 minimum wage. We compare employment
numbers if policy were adopted to employment numbers if
the policy had not been adopted.
We find that the proposed policy would result in substantial benefits to low-wage workers and their families,
raising wages for 41.5 million workers by 2024. Annual pay
for these workers will increase by 17.3 percent, or $3,470
2020 Dissertation Summaries

by 2024. These pay increases will raise overall wages in
for-profit businesses by only 0.6 percent in the United
States. This amount is surprisingly small because many of
the workers who are now paid below $15 are already paid
above the current minimum wage, and because the pay of
low-wage workers makes up a small share of total payroll
costs. Businesses will absorb the additional payroll costs
partly through savings on employee turnover costs, higher
worker productivity gains, and some automation. Most of the
increase in costs will likely be passed on to consumers via
increased prices. Since labor costs make up only about onefourth of operating costs, consumer prices will increase only
slightly—about 0.6 percent over the entire phase-in period.
Prices will be most affected in the restaurant industry, where
they will increase by 4.3 percent over the entire phase-in
period. These higher prices by themselves would somewhat
reduce consumer sales and reduce the demand for labor.
But simultaneous positive effects on increased consumer
spending from workers receiving wage increases will offset
these negative effects. After taking into account all these
factors, we estimate that the proposed minimum wage policy
would increase overall U.S. employment (as a percent of
total employment) by 0.1 percent by 2024, over the baseline.
This estimate is cumulative (and so will be spread over the
phase-in period). In comparison, U.S. employment is projected to grow 0.45 percent annually in the same time period.
We also find a similar employment effect for Mississippi.
In sum, we find that a $15 minimum wage by 2024 would
substantially improve living standards for nearly 30 percent
of the U.S. workforce (and 44 percent of Mississippi’s)
without generating a significant net adverse employment
effect. The minimum wage increase will be paid for primarily by induced efficiencies (more automation, productivity
gains, and turnover savings) and slight price increases borne
by all consumers. Based on our analysis, we conclude that
the proposed minimum wage will have its intended effects
in improving incomes for low-wage workers. Any effects on
employment and overall economic growth are likely to be
small. The net impact of the policy will therefore be positive.
Notes
1. The racial earnings gap is measured here as the mean log annual
earnings difference between white and black workers (i.e.,
conditional on working) using two data sources with information
on earnings: decennial U.S. census data, from which we measure
earnings from 1949 onwards; and an annual data source: the
Annual Social and Economic Supplement of the Current Population Survey, from which we measure earnings from 1961 to
2015. Both data sources paint a consistent picture.
2. Under the assumption of spillovers up to 115 percent (120
percent) of the minimum wage, we calculate an employment
elasticity of 0.06 (−0.21) in the treated industries as a whole,
qualitatively similar to our CPS estimates and well in the range
of those in the broader minimum wage literature.
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3. Our results are also consistent with monopsonistic models of
the labor market in which the minimum wage falls above the
monopsonist’s but below the perfect competitor’s wage.
4. In this chapter, we use “grocery sector” for grocery and drug
stores. Likewise, we sometimes use “grocery stores” throughout
the chapter for grocery stores and drug stores.
5. Outside of the United States, Fougere (2010) analyzes the
response of restaurant prices to an increase in the French minimum wage. Harasztosi and Lindner (2019) analyze the price
response of a large minimum wage increase in Hungary in the
manufacturing sector.
6. The official BLS indexes, although less detailed than microdata,
also have a number of strengths to study the effect of minimum
wage changes: they are weighted at all levels of aggregation,
rely on case-by-case adjustments for item turnover, and the
BLS has established procedures for dealing with missing price
observations.
7. For instance, Eichenbaum, Jaimovich, and Rebelo (2011) find
that pass-through is complete but somewhat delayed. Nakamura
and Zerom (2010), using variation in the market price of commodity coffee, find that the pass-through into wholesale prices
is about one-third, but that the increase of wholesale prices is
completely passed through to consumers by retail stores.
8. Relatedly, Leduc and Wilson (2013) show that public infrastructure projects have both announcement and disbursement effects.
Infrastructure spending shocks and minimum wage shocks
operate on different margins (supply versus demand shocks),
but the propagation of both kinds of shocks appear to draw on
expectation channels.
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